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A B ST R A C T
In th is research we have studied several hum an fac­
tors problems th a t are connected to  the deployment of 
speaker verification technology in telecommunication 
services. We investigate the  perception of the  safety of 
a  calling card service when it is protected by speaker 
verification on the 14 digit card number, and com­
pare it to  the  perceived safety of speaker verification 
and PIN. Moreover, we compare a voice based inter­
face to  the service w ith a DTM F based interface. The 
results are crucial for guiding the  introduction and de­
ployment of speaker verification technology in actual 
applications.
1. IN T R O D U C T IO N
Of all Speech Technology fields Speaker Recognition 
has received least attention  over the past decade. Up 
to  now hardly any research results have been pub­
lished in the  open literature on the performance and 
acceptance of speaker verification technology in tele­
phone services for the  general public. The LE project 
CAVE (Caller Verification in Telecommunication and 
Banking, LE1-1930) under the  Telematics Application 
Program m e of the EU was set up to  help remedy this 
situation [1], The CAVE project is focused on tech­
nology development and user requirem ents research 
related to  Speaker Verification. Thus, the research is 
lim ited to  applications where a caller claims an iden­
tity, and the task  of the autom atic system is to  verify 
th is claim.
The lack of solid knowledge on real world performance 
and especially on user acceptance of Speaker Verifica­
tion (SV) technology is now recognised as one of the 
factors which may slow down the large scale deploy­
m ent of Interactive Voice Response (IVR) and Elec­
tronic Commerce (EC) applications. IVR applications 
are developing from information services into trans­
action services. Many inform ation services will be­
come much more appealing if the caller can imme­
diately act upon th e  information by making transac­
tions. Moreover, many business sectors nowadays see 
a  development towards the  deployment of call centres, 
where most of their (service) operations are concen­
tra ted . One obvious example here is retail banking: 
m ost large banks are trying to  replace expensive main 
street branch offices by less expensive call centres. Up 
to  now, security in these services is based on four or 
five digit PIN num bers associated w ith card or account
numbers. If the service is completely autom atic, cus­
tom ers are usually requested to  enter th e  complete 
PIN via the  DTM F keypad. If an operator is in­
volved some companies prom pt for a random  selection 
of digits from the  PIN (so as to  prevent the operator 
from finding out combinations of account num bers and 
PINs). O ther companies, like D utch P T T  Telecom in 
its scope service (the brand nam e for the calling card 
of P T T  Telecom) have operators prom pt for the full 
four digit PIN.
Calling C ard services are one of the rare examples 
where an SV system is known to  be operational (viz. 
th e  US Sprint Foncard™  service). Yet, it appears 
to  be extremely difficult to  obtain dependable infor­
m ation on the  actual use and performance of th is SV 
protected service. This was one reason why we de­
cided to  set up a series of experiments to  investigate 
the technological and hum an factors issues involved in 
such an application.
Fraud in telem atics services is undoubtedly a m ajor 
cost factor, both  for the service provider and the  cus­
tomers. In principle, fraud can be reduced to  al­
most zero, by introducing ever more security mea­
sures. However, such measures incur very high costs 
themselves, bo th  in term s of equipm ent an d /o r opera­
tors, and in term s of hum an factors problems, because 
security measures complicate the  procedures for ac­
cessing these services. For bo th  reasons developers of 
Calling Card, Voice Mail and Home Banking services 
show their interest in speech recognition and speaker 
verification: not only to  reduce fraud, bu t also to  im­
prove the  user friendliness of the  service interfaces.
In our paper we present the  details of the design of 
an experiment w ith SV in the scope service. We com­
pare the  experim ental design w ith the approach taken 
in a companion experim ent, also in the framework of 
the CAVE project, th a t is under way in Ubilab, the 
research lab of Union Bank of Switzerland. Com par­
ison of the  two experiments, in different settings, in 
different countries and w ith different services should 
allow a b e tte r understanding of the fundam ental issues 
involved in the deployment of SV technology.
2. SPEC IFIC A TIO N  OF T H E SERVICE
In th is paper we will only describe the functionality 
of the autom atic version of the  D utch scope service. 
The functionality and th e  user interface of the  system 
under test were copied as closely as possible from the 
existing scope service, offered in the  N etherlands by
P T T  Telecom. Subscribers to  the regular service re­
ceive a ‘credit card’ w ith a 14 digit card num ber and 
a four digit PIN code. To obtain access to  the service 
the  customer dials a toll free (country direct) number. 
Depending on the country from which th e  call origi­
nates the  customer is connected w ith an IVR system 
or w ith an operator. Customers can always obtain ac­
cess to  th e  operator, by not responding to  the IVR 
prom pts (in which case th a t system assumes th a t the 
caller has no DTM F available). In order to  gain access 
to  the  service the  customer m ust provide card num ber 
and PIN. Access is only granted if the  card num ber is 
valid, and if the correct PIN is given. The IVR sys­
tem  accesses a  database to  check the  combination of 
card num ber and PIN for validity and conformity. If 
after a second a ttem p t card num ber or PIN are still 
not correct, the  caller is connected to  an operator. 
The operator prom pts for the same d a ta  for the same 
database query. If either card num ber or PIN is not 
correct, there is nothing th a t the  operator can do to  
help the customer, since operators have no access to  
the  d a ta  in the database.
Scope provides additional services (e.g. a message 
service, the possibility to  send presents to  anybody 
w ithin the  country, etc.), bu t it was decided not to  in- 
plement th is functionality in the  service as it is tested. 
Adding additional functionality to  the test system 
would have changed the design of the test completely, 
since it would no longer have been reasonable to  as­
sume th a t all subjects in the  test have prior experience 
w ith all relevant aspects of th e  service.
3. B U IL D IN G  TH E M IM IC SY STEM
For its basic functionality (i.e., making calling card 
calls) scope offers a type ahead facility in its IVR inter­
face. Customers can type card number, PIN code and 
telephone num ber (separated by asterisks and term i­
nated  by a pound sign) w ithout having to  wait for the 
prom pts. Alternatively, they have to  select the calling 
card functionality via a selection in the main menu, 
after which they are prom pted for card number, PIN 
and telephone number, always in th a t order. We de­
cided to  copy the la tte r version of the IVR interface, 
except for the  initial selection: since the  autom atic 
version only offers basic calling card services, th a t has 
become redundant. Still, using th is design it was pos­
sible to  create an interface th a t is a t once clear for the 
customer and capable of being implemented w ith ASR 
lim ited to  connected digit recognition. Moreover, cus­
tom ers should find it natural to  identify themselves by 
means of their scope card number, since th is is w hat 
they are used to  in the present operational version 
of th e  service. Names are never asked (and seldom 
given).
The interface of the  scope service as implemented 
here differs in a t least one essential way from the de­
sign in the Sprint FonCardTM  service, where cus­
tom ers have to  enter a checksum protected version 
of their social security number. By using the scope 
card num ber for the  caller to  identify her/him self we 
do not mix concepts of different worlds and services. 
Also, regular scope users know th a t their card num ber 
is m andatory to  obtain access to  the  service.
As in the  operational scope service customers are 
given two opportunities to  enter a correct combina­
tion of card num ber and PIN (in our experim ent half 
of the subjects does not need the  PIN). If after the 
second a ttem p t card num ber an d /o r PIN are still not 
valid, the caller hears an error message, saying th a t ac­
cess has failed; in the operational service (s)he would 
be passed to  an operator, bu t since th a t would be too 
expensive for our experim ent the  caller is now discon­
nected.
For lack of proven echo cancellation technology inte­
grated in the  telephony server we did not allow barge­
in. To speed up the service as much as possible great 
care was taken to  design very short, yet unambiguous 
prom pts.
To test th e  technical performance of the system and 
a t the same tim e investigate several hum an factors is­
sues, we have built a Mimic system th a t implements 
the basic Calling Card service. The flow charts of 
the two parts of the  system (enrolment and the  ac­
tual service) are shown in Fig. 1. To th a t end a con­
nected digit recogniser was trained  for Dutch, and im­
plem ented on the standard  Vocalis platform. Training 
m aterial was taken from the D utch POLYPHONE cor­
pus [2]. The ASR is used to  recognise card numbers, 
PINs and telephone numbers.
In order to  lim it undesirable interactions between 
ASR and SV performance to  a minimum heavy use 
was made of the  syntactic lim itations in card and 
telephone numbers. Especially card number, which 
should adhere to  a rigid ISO standard , obey strict 
syntax rules. By relying on these rules it was pos­
sible to  obtain ASR performance sufficient for the  ser­
vice. Recognition of PINs was enhanced by construct­
ing four digit PIN codes in which the  last digit served 
as a  checksum for the first three digits. This procedure 
is different from the operational scope service (where 
customers can select and change their PIN a t will), 
b u t it was considered acceptable in the  framework of 
th e  present experiment.
The subjects are prom pted to  speak all num bers as 
connected digits. A pilot experim ent was performed 
to  determ ine the  prom pt formulation th a t would yield 
th e  maxim um  num ber of error free tokens (no hesita­
tions, only connected digits). Two formulations were 
compared, viz.
•  Say your card number, digit by digit
•  Say your card num ber as ’eight nine three zero
Although the  first prom pt formulation yielded slightly 
more responses containing non-digit m aterial (espe­
cially w ith area codes in telephone number, where 010 
and 020 were pronounced as Oh ten or Oh twenty, we 
opted for th is formulation because it is much shorter.
A basic text-dependent speaker verification algorithm 
has been implemented on the  Vocalis hardware p la t­
form. The algorithm is based on left-to-right HMMs, 
w ith speaker models for all digits which appear in the 
card number. The num ber of states in each model 
is equal to  four tim es the num ber of phonemes in 
th e  canonical phonemic transcription of the word. A 
single Gaussian distribution is trained  for each state.
Figure 1. Flow diagrams of enrolment and service
This is the topology that appeared to perform best in 
extensive tests carried out in the technical part of the 
C A V E  project [1]. Speaker verification is attem pted 
011 the 14 digit card number only. Therefore, the card 
number is used both for the identity claim and the 
identity check.
4. T E S T  S E T -U P
The field test was set up to investigate whether a voice 
interface was accepted by the scope customers as an al­
ternative for the D TM F interface in situations where 
D TM F is not available. I11 addition, we wanted to 
know whether SV 011 the card number only, without 
the caller having to give the PIN code, was perceived 
as safe enough to accept it as an alternative for the 
D TM F interface. I11 addition, we wanted to know 
whether the customers find the version without PIN 
easier to use than the version with PIN. Therefore, 
two versions of the application were built., one which 
exactly copies the D TM F interface (prompt for card 
number, PIN, and telephone number) and another one 
in which the prompt for the PIN was omitted.
4 .1 . S u b je c ts
Eighty subjects (40 females and 40 males) were re­
cruited from the staff of P T T  Telecom, all of whom 
were frequent users of the scope service. Therefore, all 
subjects knew the interface of the service, as well as 
its basic functionality. Half of the subjects were as­
signed to the wit.li-PIN group, whereas the remaining 
40 subjects were assigned to the wit.liout.-PIN group. 
The subjects received a temporary scope card, with an 
attendant. PIN code (if they belong to the ‘with PIN ’ 
group.
The requirement, that, all subjects know the service is 
considered of primary importance. Experience shows 
that, many experiments with speech based services run
into difficulties because the subjects do not. under­
stand the service under investigation. Scope makes 
large investments in customer education, for instance 
by means of a quarterly magazine, in which the ser­
vice and its interface is always explained. These ed­
ucational activities will remain necessary until it. is 
feasible to market, services based 011 intelligent, spo­
ken dialogues and intelligent, agents that, know liow to 
adapt, very rapidly to the experience that, a customer 
lias with the service.
4 .2 . E x p e r im e n ta l p ro ced u re
After having completed the enrolment., subjects had 
to call the system at. least, five times during a one 
week period under t.lieir own identity. The service ac­
cess dialogues of all calls have been recorded for fur­
ther analysis. All subjects received card number and 
PIN of three other subjects, whom they did not. know. 
They were asked to try and break into the account, of 
these victims, in order to get. a feeling for the safety 
offered by the SV protection. Subjects were not. sug­
gested to invite relatives to break into t.lieir accounts 
by using t.lieir card number and PIN.
I11 our experimental setup subjects are encouraged to 
call the system, because each time they obtain access 
they are allowed to make a ten minute domestic call 
for free. This design should guarantee that, all subjects 
do call at. least, five times.
W ith t.lieir invitation and instruction letter subjects 
received a booklet, with preprinted forms, designed to 
record t.lieir calling behaviour. For each call they were 
asked to record whether it. was made as a true cus­
tomer or as impostor, and whether it. was successful. 
I11 case of failure, they were requested to record the 
cause of the failure (110 correct, verification of t.lieir 
ID, failure of A SR  to recognise card number, PIN or 
telephone number, etc.). The main function of the 
booklets was to support, the subjects in filling out. the
questionnaire, or in answering the  questions when they 
were called by the experimenter.
4.3. Enrolm ent
All subjects went through a single enrolment session, 
in which they had to  say their card num ber three 
tim es, spoken as a digit string. These utterances 
formed the enrolm ent speech. Enrolm ent was done 
off-line. The th ree productions of the card num ber 
were checked auditorily. If one or more of th e  tokens 
contained errors, th e  subject was called by the exper­
imenter, and asked to  repeat the enrolm ent session.
It is well known th a t a single enrolm ent session is 
not enough to  obtain good estim ates of the variation 
w ithin a custom er’s speech behaviour, nor of the  vari­
ation caused by different handsets and acoustic back­
grounds. Yet, most service providers believe th a t a 
single enrolm ent session is the  maximum they can ask 
of their customers. The technological problems can 
be solved by using incremental enrolm ent, using con­
firmed access a ttem p ts to  improve the speakers’ mod­
els. However, for the Mimic test reported  here incre­
m ental enrolm ent was not available.
4.4. The Q uestionnaire
The questionnaire used in the  Mimic test consists of 
seven sections, four of which contain open questions. 
The remaining th ree sections consist of Likert scales, 
i.e., statem ents for which the subjects are asked to  say 
to  w hat extent the  (dis)agree. Of the  four sections 
w ith open questions, th ree are reserved for a subset of 
ten  subjects, random ly selected from the two groups 
(with and w ithout PIN). The questions define a semi­
structured  interview, designed to  obtain information 
th a t should be useful in future experiments.
The first open question section is related to  the  test 
itself. Subjects are asked to  give a general impression, 
and to  point out aspects th a t struck them  as especially 
good or bad.
The second set of open questions addresses the speech 
based service interface and the way in which it has 
been used by th is subject during the experiment. 
Among other things, it is asked w hat th is subject 
missed in the service under test, whether a ttem pts 
were made to  break into other sub je ts’ accounts, and 
whether it seems to  be a good idea to  leave out the 
PIN. Of course, the way in which the last question 
is form ulated differently for subjects in th e  w ith and 
w ithout PIN groups.
The th ird  section of questions in the sem i-structured 
interview relates to  the present scope service. We want 
to  know subjects’ experience w ith th e  service: w hat 
do they use it for and how do they like the DTM F 
interface.
The first set of Likert scales, completed by all sub­
jects, is related to  enrolment. We did not ask whether 
subjects would have been willing to  go through two 
or more enrolm ent sessions. The m ajor reason for not 
asking th a t question is th a t we do not expect naive 
subjects to  know how much security would be added 
by additional enrolm ent sessions. For the same rea­
son we only ask whether th e  enrolm ent session was 
perceived as being too long and complicated, w ithout 
the companion statem ent implying th a t enrolm ent was
too short and easy.
The second set of Likert scales addresses the  actual 
use of the speech based service. It includes statem ents 
about th e  perceived security of th e  SV protected ser­
vice (the same statem ents have been used for the  with 
and w ithout PIN groups), statem ents comparing the 
speed and user friendliness of the  speech based inter­
face com pared to  the existing scope service, about the 
procedures for coping w ith problems w ith th e  speech 
based interface and about the sufficiency of the infor­
m ation about th e  new interface (both prior to  its use 
-in the  form of w ritten instructions- and during the 
use -in th e  form of w hat little help information th a t is 
given).
The last set of Likert scales is about the  perception of 
the performance of the underlying technology, ASR as 
well as SV.
The last set of open questions, to  be answered by all 
subjects, addresses general aspects of the calling card 
service and its use. To some extent it overlaps with 
th e  questions th a t have already been described for the 
semi- structured  interview.
5. RESULTS A N D  D ISC U SSIO N
At the  tim e of th is writing the  experim ent was not yet 
completed, mainly because of unexpected difficulties 
in building a stable operational system. Full results 
will, however, be available a t the tim e of the confer­
ence.
One problem we will have to  solve in d a ta  process­
ing is due to  the fact th a t the  subjects were free to  
call whenever they wanted and from wherever they 
wanted. As a consequence, there is no incontestable 
evidence of the identity of th e  callers.
6. CO NCLUSIO N
In th is paper we have described the design of a field 
test of a calling card service protected by means of 
Speaker Verification. In a version of the service th a t 
uses speech instead of D TM F and SV instead of, or 
in addition to  a PIN, we have investigated a number 
of hum an factors aspects of the deployment of a  com­
bination of SV and ASR in a service for the  general 
public.
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